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We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild re-
quirements fails to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We
also show that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not ro-
bust to small changes in the speciﬁcations of the dynamics. Numerical analysis
reveals that dominated strategies can persist at nontrivial frequencies even when
the level of domination is not small.
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1. Introduction
One fundamental issue in evolutionary game theory concerns the relationship between
its predictions and those provided by traditional, rationality-based solution concepts.
Indeed, much of the early interest in the theory among economists is due to its ability to
justify traditional equilibrium predictions as consequences of myopic decisions made
by simple agents.
Some of the best known results in this vein link the rest points of a deterministic
evolutionary dynamic with the Nash equilibria of the game being played. Under most
dynamics considered in the literature, the set of rest points includes all Nash equilibria
of the underlying game, and under many of these dynamics the sets of rest points and
Nash equilibria are identical.1
To improve on these results, one might look for dynamics that converge to Nash
equilibrium from most initial conditions regardless of the game at hand. Such a ﬁnd-
ing would provide a strong defense of the Nash prediction, as agents who began play
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at some disequilibrium state could be expected to ﬁnd their way to Nash equilibrium.
Unfortunately, results of this kind cannot be proved. Hofbauer and Swinkels (1996) and
Hart and Mas-Colell (2003) show that no reasonable evolutionary dynamic converges to
Nash equilibrium in all games: there are some games in which cycling or more com-
plicated limit behavior far from any Nash equilibrium is the only plausible long run
prediction.
These negative resultsleadus to consider a moremodest question. Rather than seek
evolutionary support for equilibrium play, we instead turn our attention to a more basic
rationality requirement, namely, the avoidance of strategies that are strictly dominated
b yap u r es t r a t e g y .
Research on this question to date has led to a number of positive results. Two of the
canonical evolutionary dynamics are known to eliminate strictly dominated strategies,
at least from most initial conditions. Akin (1980) shows that starting from any interior
population state, the replicator dynamic (Taylor and Jonker 1978) eliminates strategies
that are strictly dominated by a pure strategy. Samuelson and Zhang (1992), building on
the work of Nachbar (1990), extend this result to a broad class of evolutionary dynam-
ics driven by imitation: namely, dynamics under which strategies’ percentage growth
rates are ordered by their payoffs.2 Elimination results are also available for dynam-
ics based on traditional choice criteria: the best response dynamic (Gilboa and Matsui
1991) eliminates strictly dominated strategies by construction, as under this dynamic,
revising agents always switch to optimal strategies. Since the elimination of strategies
strictly dominated by a pure strategy is the mildest requirement employed in standard
game-theoretic analyses, it may seem unsurprising that two basic evolutionary dynam-
ics obey this dictum.
In this paper, we argue that evolutionary support for the elimination of dominated
strategies is more tenuous than the results noted above suggest. In particular, we prove
that all evolutionary dynamics satisfying four mild conditions—continuity, positive cor-
relation, Nash stationarity, and innovation—must fail to eliminate strictly dominated
strategies in some games. Dynamics satisfying these conditions include not only well
known dynamics from the evolutionary literature, but also slight modiﬁcations of the
dynamics under which elimination is known to occur. In effect, this paper shows that
the dynamics known to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in all games are the only
ones one should expect to do so, and that even these elimination results are knife-edge
cases.
An important predecessor of this study is the work of Berger and Hofbauer (2006),
who present a game in which a strictly dominated strategy survives under the Brown–
von Neumann–Nash (BNN) dynamic (Brown and von Neumann 1950). We begin the
present study by showing how Berger and Hofbauer’s (2006) analysis can be extended to
a variety of other dynamics, including the Smith dynamic (Smith 1984) as well as gener-
alizationsofboththeBNNandSmithdynamics(Hofbauer2000,Sandholm2005,2010a).
While this analysis is relatively simple, it is not general, as it depends on the functional
2Samuelson and Zhang (1992) and Hofbauer and Weibull (1996) also introduce classes of imitative dy-




Our main theorem provides such a result. Rather than specifying functional forms
fortheevolutionarydynamicsunderconsideration,thetheoremallowsforanydynamic
satisfying four mild conditions. The ﬁrst, continuity, asks that the dynamic change con-
tinuously as a function of the payoff vector and the population state. The second, pos-
itive correlation, is a weak montonicity condition: it demands that away from equilib-
rium, the correlation between strategies’ payoffs and growth rates always be positive.
Thethirdcondition,Nashstationarity,asksthatstatesthatarenotNashequilibria—that
is, states where payoff improvement opportunities are available—are not rest points of
the dynamic. The ﬁnal condition, innovation, is a requirement that has force only at
non-Nash boundary states: if at such a state some unused strategy is a best response,
the growth rate of this strategy must be positive. The last two conditions rule out the
replicator dynamic and the other purely imitative dynamics noted above; at the same
time, theyallowarbitrarily closeapproximations ofthesedynamics, underwhichagents
usually imitate successful opponents, but occasionally select new strategies directly.
To prove the main theorem, we construct a four-strategy game in which one strat-
egy is strictly dominated by another pure strategy. We show that under any dynamic
satisfying our four conditions, the strictly dominated strategy survives along solution
trajectories starting from most initial conditions.
Because evolutionary dynamics are deﬁned by nonlinear differential equations, our
formal results rely on topological properties, and so provide limited quantitative infor-
mation about the conditions under which dominated strategies survive. We therefore
supplement our formal approach with numerical analysis. This analysis reveals that
dominated strategies with payoffs substantially lower than those of their dominating
strategies can be played at nontrivial frequencies in perpetuity.
Since elimination of dominated strategies is a basic requirement of traditional game
theory, the fact that such strategies can persist under evolutionary dynamics may seem
counterintuitive. A partial resolution of this puzzle lies in the fact that survival of domi-
nated strategies is intrinsically a disequilibrium phenomenon.
To understand this point, remember that evolutionary dynamics capture the aggre-
gate behavior of agents who follow simple myopic rules. These rules lead agents to
switch to strategies whose current payoffs are good, though not necessarily optimal.
When a solution trajectory of an evolutionary dynamic converges, the payoffs to
each strategy converge as well. Because payoffs become ﬁxed, even simple rules are
enough to ensure that only optimal strategies are chosen. In formal terms, the limits of
convergent solution trajectories must be Nash equilibria; it follows a fortiori that when
these limits are reached, strictly dominated strategies are not chosen.
Of course, it is well understood that solutions of evolutionary dynamics need not
converge, but instead may enter limit cycles or more complicated limit sets.3 When
3For speciﬁc nonconvergence results, see Shapley (1964), Jordan (1993), Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer
(1995), Hofbauer and Swinkels (1996), Hart and Mas-Colell (2003), and Sparrow et al. (2008);s e eSandholm
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solutions do not converge, payoffs remain in ﬂux. In this situation, it is not obvious
whether choice rules favoring strategies whose current payoffs are relatively high neces-
sarily eliminate strategies that perform well at many states, but that are never optimal.
To the contrary, the analysis in this paper demonstrates that if play remains in disequi-
librium, even strategies that are strictly dominated by other pure strategies can persist
indeﬁnitely.
One possible reaction to our results is to view them as an argument against the rel-
evance of evolutionary dynamics for modeling economic behavior. If an agent notices
that a strategy is strictly dominated, then he would do well to avoid playing it, whatever
his rule of thumb might suggest. We agree with the latter sentiment: we do not expect
agents, even simple ones, to play strategies they know to be dominated. At the same
time, we feel that the ability to recognize dominated strategies should not be taken for
granted. In complicated games with large numbers of participants, it may not always
be reasonable to expect agents to know the payoffs to all strategies at every population
state, or to be able to make all the comparisons needed to identify a dominated strategy.
It is precisely in such large, complex games that agents might be expected to make de-
cisions by applying rules of thumb. Our analysis suggests that if agents cannot directly
excludedominatedstrategiesfromtheirrepertoireofchoices,thenthesestrategiesneed
not fade from use through a lack of positive reinforcement.
To prove our main result, we must show that for each member of a large class of de-
terministic evolutionary dynamics, there is a game in which dominated strategies sur-
vive. To accomplish this most directly, we use the same construction for all dynamics
in the class. We begin by introducing a three-strategy game with nonlinear payoffs—the
hypnodiskgame—underwhichsolutiontrajectoriesofalldynamicsintheclassentercy-
cles fromalmost all initial conditions. We then modify this game by adding a dominated
fourth strategy, and show that the proportion of the population playing this strategy
stays bounded away from zero along solutions starting from most initial conditions.
Sincethegameweconstructtoensurecyclicalbehaviorisratherunusual,onemight
wonder whether our survival results are of practical relevance, rather than being a mere
artifact of a pathological construction. In fact, while introducing a special game is quite
convenient for proving the main result, we feel that our basic message—that in the ab-
senceofconvergence, myopicheuristics neednotrootoutdominatedstrategiesin large
games—is of broader relevance. In Section 5.1, we explain why the proof of the main
theorem does not depend on the introduction of a complicated game in an essential
way. Analyses there and elsewhere in the paper suggest that in any game for which
some dynamic covered by the theorem fails to converge, there are augmented games
with dominated strategies that the dynamic allows to survive.
Section 2 introduces population gamesand evolutionary dynamics. Section 3 estab-
lishes the survival results for excess payoff dynamics and pairwise comparison dynam-
ics, whicharefamiliesthatcontaintheBNNandSmithdynamics, respectively. Section 4
states and proves the main result. Section 5 presents our numerical analyses and illus-
trates the sensitivity of existing elimination results to slight modiﬁcations of the dynam-
ics in question. Section 6 concludes. Auxiliary results and proofs omitted from the text




from the ﬁnite set of strategies S ={ 1     n}. The set of population states is therefore
the simplex X ={ x ∈ Rn
+:
 
i∈S xi = 1},w h e r exi is the proportion of agents who choose
strategy i ∈ S. The standard basis vector ei ∈ Rn represents the state at which all agents
choose strategy i.
Ifwetakethesetofstrategiesasﬁxed,wecanidentifyagamewithaLipschitzcontin-
uous payoff function F :X → Rn, which assigns each population state x ∈ X a vector of
payoffs F(x)∈ Rn. The component Fi:X → R represents the payoffs to strategy i alone.
We also let ¯ F(x)=
 
i∈S xiFi(x) denote the population’s average payoff and let BF(x) =
argmaxy∈X y F(x)denote the set of (mixed) best responses at population state x.
The simplest examples of population games are generated by random matching in
symmetric normal form games. An n-strategy symmetric normal form game is deﬁned
by a payoff matrix A ∈ Rn×n.H e r e Aij denotes the payoff a player obtains when he
chooses strategy i and his opponent chooses strategy j; this payoff does not depend
on whether the player in question is called player 1 or player 2. When agents are ran-
domly matched to play this game, the (expected) payoff to strategy i at population state
x is Fi(x) =
 
j∈S Aijxj; hence,thepopulationgameassociatedwith A isthelineargame
F(x)= Ax.
Whilerandommatchinggeneratespopulationgameswithlinearpayoffs,manypop-
ulation games that arise in applications have payoffs that are nonlinear in the popula-
tion state; see Section 5.1. Games with nonlinear payoff functions play a leading role in
the analysis to come.
2.2 Evolutionary dynamics
AnevolutionarydynamicassignseachpopulationgameF anordinarydifferentialequa-
tion ˙ x = V F(x) on the simplex X. One simple and general way to deﬁne an evolutionary
dynamic is via a growth rate function g:Rn × X → Rn;h e r egi(π x) represents the (ab-
solute) growth rate of strategy i as a function of the current payoff vector π ∈ Rn and the
current population state x ∈ X. Our notation suppresses the dependence of g on the
number of strategies n.
To ensure that the simplex is forward invariant under the induced differential equa-
tions, the function g must satisfy
gi(π x) ≥ 0 whenever xi = 0  and
 
i∈S
gi(π x) = 0 
In words, strategies that are currently unused cannot become less common, and the
sum of all strategies’ growth rates must equal zero. A growth rate function g satisfying
these conditions deﬁnes an evolutionary dynamic as
˙ xi = V F
i (x) = gi(F(x) x) 
4Versions of our results can also be proved in multipopulation models.346 Hofbauer and Sandholm Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Revision protocol Evolutionary dynamic Name Origin
ρij = xj[Fj −Fi]+ ˙ xi = xi(Fi(x)− ¯ F(x)) Replicator Taylor and Jonker (1978)
ρij = BF
j (x) ˙ x ∈ BF(x)−x Best response Gilboa and Matsui (1991)




ρij =[ Fj −Fi]+ ˙ xi =
 




Table 1. Four evolutionary dynamics and their revision protocols.
One can also build evolutionary dynamics from a more structured model that not
only provides explicit microfoundations for the dynamics, but also is inclusive enough
to encompass all dynamics considered in the literature.5 In this model, the growth rate
function g is replaced by a revision protocol ρ:Rn ×X → Rn×n
+ , which describes the pro-
cess through which individual agents make decisions. As time passes, agents arechosen
at random from the population and granted opportunities to switch strategies. When
an i player receives such an opportunity, he switches to strategy j with probability pro-
portional to the conditional switch rate ρij(π x). Aggregate behavior in the game F is
then described by the differential equation







ρij(F(x) x)  (1)
whichisknownasthemeandynamic generatedbyρandF.T h eﬁ r s tt e r mi n( 1)captures
the inﬂow of agents into strategy i from other strategies, while the second term captures
the outﬂow of agents from strategy i to other strategies.
Table 1 presents four basic examples of evolutionary dynamics, along with revision
protocols that generate them. Further discussion of these dynamics can be found in
Sections 3.1, 5.3,a n d5.4 below.
3. Survival under the BNN, Smith, and related dynamics
Using a somewhat informal analysis, Berger and Hofbauer (2006) argue that strictly
dominated strategies can survive under the BNN dynamic (Brown and von Neumann
1950). To prepare for our main result, we formalize and extend Berger and Hofbauer’s
(2006) arguments to prove a survival result for two families of evolutionary dynamics;
these families include the BNN dynamic and the Smith dynamic (Smith 1984)a st h e i r
simplest members.
3.1 Excess payoff dynamics and pairwise comparison dynamics
The two families of dynamics we consider are based on revision protocols of the forms
ρij = φ(Fj − ¯ F) (2)
5For explicit accounts of microfoundations, see Benaïm and Weibull (2003) and Sandholm (2003).Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Survival of dominated strategies 347
and
ρij = φ(Fj −Fi)  (3)
where, in each case, φ:R → R+ is a Lipschitz continuous function satisfying




   
 
u=0
> 0  (4)
The families of evolutionary dynamics obtained by substituting expressions (2)a n d( 3)
into the mean dynamic (1) are called excess payoff dynamics (Weibull 1996, Hofbauer
2000, Sandholm 2005)a n dpairwise comparison dynamics (Sandholm 2010a), respec-
tively. TheBNNandSmithdynamicsaretheprototypicalmembersofthesetwofamilies:
examiningTable1,weseethatthesetwodynamicsarethoseobtainedfromprotocols(2)
and (3)w h e nφ is the semilinear function φ(u)=[ u]+.
Protocols of forms (2)a n d( 3) describe distinct revision processes. Under (2), an
agent who receives a revision opportunity has a positive probability of switching to any
strategy whose payoff exceeds the population’s average payoff; the agent’s current pay-
off has no bearing on his switching rates. Under (3), an agent who receives a revision
opportunity has a positive probability of switching to any strategy whose payoff exceeds
that of his current strategy. While the latter protocols lead to mean dynamics with more
complicated functional forms (compare the BNN and Smith dynamics in Table 1), they
also seem more realistic than those of form (2): protocols satisfying (3)m a k ea na g e n t ’ s
decisions depend on his current payoffs, and do not require him to know the average
payoff obtained in the population as a whole.
3.2 Theorem and proof
Theorem1showsthatexcesspayoffdynamicsandpairwisecomparisondynamicsallow
dominated strategies to survive in some games.6
Theorem1. SupposethatV isanevolutionarydynamicbasedonarevisionprotocolρof
form (2)o r( 3), where the function φ satisﬁes condition (4). Then there is a game Fd such
that under V Fd, along solutions from most initial conditions, there is a strictly dominated
strategy played by a fraction of the population that is bounded away from 0 and that
exceeds 1
6 inﬁnitely often as time approaches inﬁnity.
While the computations needed to prove Theorem 1 differ according to the dynamic
under consideration, the three main steps are always the same. First, we show that for
each of the relevant dynamics, play converges to a limit cycle in the bad rock–paper–
scissors game (Figure 1). Second, we introduce a new strategy, twin, which duplicates
the strategy scissors, and show that in the resulting four-strategy game, solutions to the
dynamic from almost all initial conditions converge to a cycling attractor; this attractor
sitsontheplanewherescissorsandtwinareplayedbyequalnumbersofagents,andhas
6In the statements of Theorems 1 and 2, “most initial conditions” means all initial conditions outside an
open set of measure ε,w h e r eε>0 is speciﬁed before the choice of the game Fd.348 Hofbauer and Sandholm Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Figure 1. The Smith dynamic in bad RPS. Colors represent speeds of motion: red is faster; blue
is slower.
Figure 2. The Smith dynamic in “bad RPS with a twin.”
regions where both scissors and twin are played by more than 1
6 of the population (Fig-
ure 2). Third, we uniformly reduce the payoff of the new strategy by d, creating a “feeble
twin,” and use a continuity argument to show that the attractor persists (Figure 3). Since
the feeble twin is a strictly dominated strategy, this last step completes the proof of the
theorem.
We now present the proof in more detail, relegating some parts of the argument to
the Appendixes.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Survival of dominated strategies 349
Figure 3. The Smith dynamic in “bad RPS with a feeble twin.”
Proof of Theorem 1. Fix a dynamic V (i.e., a map from population games F to differ-
ential equations ˙ x = V F(x)) generated by a revision protocol ρ that satisﬁes the condi-
tions of the theorem. We construct a game Fd in which a dominated strategy survives
under V Fd.
To begin, we introduce the bad rock–paper–scissors (RPS) game














⎠  where b>a>0 
(Since b>a, the cost of losing a match exceeds the beneﬁt of winning a match.) For any




proof does not require this fact, it can be shown as a corollary of Lemma 1 below that y∗
is unstable under the dynamic V G.
Next, following Berger and Hofbauer (2006), we introduce a four-strategy game F,
which we obtain from bad RPS by introducing an “identical twin” of scissors.






























We now present two lemmas that describe the behavior of the dynamic V F for
game F. The ﬁrst lemma concerns the local stability of the set of Nash equilibria NE.
Lemma 1. The set NE is a repellor under the dynamic V F:t h e r ei san e i g h b o r h o o dU of
NE such that all trajectories starting in U −NE leave U and never return.350 Hofbauer and Sandholm Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
The proof of this lemma, which is based on construction of appropriate Lyapunov
functions, is presented in Appendix B.
Since V is an excess payoff dynamic or a pairwise comparison dynamic, the rest
points of V F a r ep r e c i s e l yt h eN a s he q u i l i b r i ao fF (see Sandholm 2005, 2010a). There-
fore, Lemma 1 implies that solutions of V F from initial conditions outside NE do not
convergetorestpoints. Ournextlemmaconstrainsthelimitbehaviorofthesesolutions.
Since the revision protocol ρ treats strategies symmetrically, and since scissors and
twin always earn the same payoffs (F3(x) ≡ F4(x)), it follows that
ρj3(F(x) x) = ρj4(F(x) x) and ρ3j(F(x) x) = ρ4j(F(x) x) for all x ∈ X 
These equalities yield a simple expression for the rate of change of the difference in uti-
lizations of strategies 3 (scissors) and 4 (twin):





















Since conditional switch rates ρij are nonnegative by deﬁnition, (6) implies that the
plane P ={ x ∈ X :x3 = x4} on which the identical twins receive equal weight is invariant
under V F, and that distance from P is nonincreasing under V F.I nf a c t ,w ec a ne s t a b l i s h
the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Solutions of the dynamic V F starting outside the set NE converge to the
plane P.
Proving Lemma 2 is straightforward when ρ is of the excess payoff form (2), since in
this case, it can be shown that ˙ x3 < ˙ x4 whenever x3 >x 4 and x/ ∈ NE, and that ˙ x3 − ˙ x4 > 0
whenever x3 <x 4 and x/ ∈ NE. But when ρ is of the pairwise comparison form (3), one
needs to establish that solutions to V F cannot become stuck in regions where ˙ x3 = ˙ x4.
The proof of Lemma 2 is provided in Appendix B.
Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that all solutions of V F other than those starting in NE
converge to an attractor A, a set that is compact (see Appendix A), is disjoint from





6) (see Figure 2). It follows that there are portions of A where more than 1
6
of the population plays twin.
Finally, we modify the game F by making twin “feeble”: in other words, by uniformly
reducing its payoff by d:
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If d>0,s t r a t e g y4 is strictly dominated by strategy 3.
Increasing d from 0 continuously changes the game from F to Fd, and so contin-
uously changes the dynamic from V F to V Fd (where continuity is with respect to the
supremum norm topology). It thus follows from results on continuation of attractors
(Theorem 3 in Appendix A) that for small domination levels d, the attractor A of V F con-
tinues to an attractor Ad that is contained in a neighborhood of A, and that the basin of
attraction of Ad contains all points outside of a thin tube around the set NE.
On the attractor A, the speed of rotation under V F around the segment NE is
bounded away from 0. Therefore, by continuity, the attractor Ad of V Fd must encircle
NE, and so must contain states at which x4, the weight on the strictly dominated strat-
egy twin, is more than 1
6. By the same logic, solutions of V Fd that converge to Ad have
ω-limit sets with these same properties. In conclusion, we have shown that most solu-
tions of V Fd converge to the attractor Ad,as e to nw h i c hx4 is bounded away from 0, and
that these solutions satisfy x4 > 1
6 inﬁnitely often in the long run. This completes the
proof of Theorem 1. 
It is worth noting that the number 1
6, the bound that the weight on the dominated
strategy continually exceeds, is not as large as possible. By replacing A, a cyclically sym-
metric version of bad rock–paper–scissors, with an asymmetric version of this game, we
can move theunstable Nash equilibrium from y∗ = (1
3  1
3  1
3) to a state where thefraction
of the population choosing scissors is as close to 1 as desired (see Gaunersdorfer and
Hofbauer 1995). Then repeating the rest of the proof above, we ﬁnd that the bound of 1
6
in the statement of Theorem 1 can be replaced by any number less than 1
2.
The analysis above makes explicit use of the functional forms of excess payoff and
pairwise comparison dynamics. This occurs ﬁrst in the proof of Lemma 1,w h i c hs t a t e s
that the set of Nash equilibria of “bad RPS with a twin” is a repellor. The Lyapunov
functions used to prove this lemma depend on the functional forms of the dynamics;
indeed, there are evolutionary dynamics for which the equilibrium of bad RPS is at-
tracting instead of repelling. Functional forms are also important in proving Lemma 2,
which states that almost all solutions to dynamics from the two classes lead to the plane
on which the identical twins receive equal weights. For arbitrary dynamics, particularly
ones that do not respect the symmetry of the game, convergence to this plane is not
guaranteed. To establish our main result, in which nothing is presumed about func-
tional forms, both of these steps from the proof above need to be replaced by more gen-
eral arguments.
4. The main theorem
4.1 Statement of the theorem
While the proof of Theorem 1 takes advantage of the functional forms of excess payoff
and pairwise comparison dynamics, the survival of dominated strategies is a more gen-
eral phenomenon. We now introduce a set of mild conditions that are enough to yield
this result.352 Hofbauer and Sandholm Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
(C) Continuity: The function g is Lipschitz continuous.
(PC) Positive correlation:I fV F(x)  = 0,t h e nV F(x) F(x)>0.
(NS) Nash stationarity:I fV F(x) = 0,t h e nx ∈ NE(F).
(IN) Innovation:I fx/ ∈ NE(F), xi = 0,a n dei ∈ BF(x),t h e nV F
i (x) > 0.
Continuity (C) requires that small changes in aggregate behavior or payoffs do not
lead to large changes in the law of motion V F(x) = g(F(x) x). Since discontinuous revi-
sion protocols can be executed only by agents with extremely accurate information, this
condition seems natural in most contexts where evolutionary models are appropriate.
Of course, this condition excludes the best response dynamic from our analysis, but it
does not exclude continuous approximations thereof; see Section 5.4.
Positive correlation (PC) is a mild payoff monotonicity condition. It requires that
whenever the population is not at rest, there is a positive correlation between strategies’
growth rates and payoffs.7 From a geometric point of view, condition (PC) requires that
the directions of motion V F(x) and the payoff vectors F(x) always form acute angles
with one another. This interpretation is helpful for understanding the constructions to
come.
Nashstationarity (NS)requiresthatthedynamicV F beatrestonlyatNashequilibria
of F. This condition captures the idea that agents eventually recognize payoff improve-
ment opportunities, preventing the population from settling down at a state where such
opportunities are present.8
In a similar spirit, innovation (IN) requires that when a non-Nash population state
includes an unused optimal strategy, this strategy’s growth rate must be strictly positive.
In other words, if an unplayed strategy is sufﬁciently rewarding, some members of the
population will discover it and select it.
A few further comments about conditions (PC), (NS), and (IN) may be helpful in
interpreting ourresults. First, condition(PC)isamongtheweakestmonotonicity condi-
tions proposed in the evolutionary literature.9 Thus, our arguments that appeal to this
condition are robust, in that they apply to any dynamic that respects the payoffs from
the underlying game to some weak extent.
Second, since condition (PC) requires a positive correlation between growth rates
and payoffs at all population states, it rules out evolutionary dynamics under which the
boundaryofthestatespaceisrepellingdueto“mutations”orotherformsofnoise. Con-
sequently, condition (PC) excludes the possibility that a dominated strategy survives for
trivial reasons of this sort.
7Requiring growth rates to respect payoffs appears to work against the survival of dominated strategies.
At the same time, some structure must be imposed on the dynamics so as to make headway with our analy-
sis, and we hesitate to consider a dynamic that does not satisfy a condition in the spirit of (PC) as a general
model of evolution in games. Even so, we discuss the prospects for omitting this condition in Section 5.5.
8The converse of this condition, that all Nash equilibria are rest points, follows easily from condition
(PC); see Sandholm (2001).
9Conditions similar to (PC) are proposed, for example, in Friedman (1991), Swinkels (1993), and
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Third, conditions (NS) and (IN)all ruleoutdynamics basedexclusively onimitation.
At the same time, all of these conditions are satisﬁed by dynamics under which agents
usuallyimitate,butoccasionallyevaluate,strategiesinamoredirectfashion. Wepresent
this idea in some detail in Section 5.3.
The main result of this paper is Theorem 2.
Theorem2. SupposetheevolutionarydynamicV satisﬁes(C),(PC),(NS),and(IN).Then
there is a game Fd such that under V Fd, along solutions from most initial conditions,
thereisastrictlydominatedstrategyplayedbyafractionofthepopulationboundedaway
from 0.
Before proceeding, we point out that the conclusion of Theorem 2 is weaker than
that of Theorem 1 in one notable respect: while Theorem 1 e n s u r e st h a ta tl e a s t1
6 of the
population plays the dominated strategy inﬁnitely often, Theorem 2 only ensures that
the strategy is always used by a proportion of the population bounded away from 0. The
reasonforthisweakerconclusionistheabsenceofanyassumptionthatthedynamicV F
treats different strategies symmetrically. Adding such a symmetry assumption allows us
to recover the stronger conclusion. See Section 4.2.4 for further discussion.10
4.2 Proof of the theorem
As we noted earlier, the proof of Theorem 1 takes advantage of the functional forms of
the dynamics at issue. Since Theorem 2 provides no such structure, its proof requires
some new ideas.
Our ﬁrst task is to construct a replacement for the bad RPS game. More precisely,
we seek a three-strategy game in which dynamics satisfying condition (PC) fail to con-
verge to Nash equilibrium from almost all initial conditions. Our construction relies on
the theory of potential games, developed in the normal form context by Monderer and
Shapley (1996) and Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998), and in the population game context
by Sandholm (2001, 2009b).
4.2.1 Potential games A population game F is a potential game if there exists a contin-
uously differentiable function f :Rn
+ → R satisfying
∇f(x)= F(x) for all x ∈ X 
Putdifferently,eachstrategy’spayofffunctionmustequaltheappropriatepartialderiva-
tive of the potential function:
∂f
∂xi
(x) = Fi(x) for all i ∈ S and x ∈ X 
10TheproofofTheorem2establishesthatthedynamic V Fd forthegame Fd admitsanattractoronwhich
the proportion of agents using a dominated strategy is bounded away from zero, and whose basin contains
all initial conditions in X outside a set of small but positive measure. It therefore follows from Theorem 3
thatthedominatedstrategycontinuesto surviveif thedynamicis subjecttosmallperturbationsrepresent-
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Games that satisfy this condition include common interest games and congestion
games, among many others. A basic fact about potential games is that reasonable evo-
lutionary dynamics increase potential: if the dynamic V F satisﬁes condition (PC), then
along each solution trajectory {xt},w eh a v et h a t
d
dt
f(xt) =∇f(xt) ˙ xt = F(xt) V F(xt) ≥ 0
with equalityonly at Nash equilibria. This observation, along with standard resultsfrom
dynamicalsystems,impliesthateachsolutiontrajectoryofV F convergestoaconnected
set of Nash equilibria; see Sandholm (2001).










The resulting population game, FC(x) = Cx = x, is a potential game; its potential
function, fC(x) = 1
2x Cx= 1
2((x1)2 + (x2)2 + (x3)2), is the convex function pictured in
Figure 4(i). Solutions to any evolutionary dynamic that satisﬁes condition (PC) ascend
this function. Indeed, solutions from almost all initial conditions converge to a vertex
of X—that is, to a strict equilibrium of FC.
The ability to draw the game FC itself will prove useful in the analysis to come. No-
tice that FC is a map from the simplex X ⊂ R3 to R3, and so can be viewed as a vector
ﬁeld. Rather than draw FC as a vector ﬁeld in R3, we draw a projected version of FC on
t h eh y p e r p l a n ei nR3 that contains the simplex.11 The vectors drawn in Figure 4(ii) rep-
resent the directions of maximal increase of the function fC, and so point outward from
the center of the simplex. Dynamics that satisfy condition (PC) always travel at acute
angles to the vectors in Figure 4(ii), and so tend toward the vertices of X, and solutions
from almost all initial conditions converge to a vertex of X.
As a second example, suppose that agents are randomly matched to play the an-
ticoordination game −C.I n Figure 5(i) and (ii), we draw the resulting population









4.2.2 The hypnodisk game We now use the coordination game FC and the anticoor-
dination game F−C to construct our replacement for bad RPS. While FC and F−C are
potential games with linear payoffs, our new game has neither of these properties.
The construction is easiest to describe in geometric terms. Begin with the coordina-
tion game FC(x) = Cx pictured in Figure 4(ii). Then draw two circles centered at state
11Moreprecisely,wedrawthevectorﬁeld  FC,wher e  = I− 1
311  ∈ R3×3 istheorthogonalprojectionof
R3 onto TX={ z ∈ R3 :
 
i∈S zi = 0}, thetangentspaceofthesimplex X. Theprojection   forcesthecompo-
nentsof  FC(x) tosum to zero while preserving their differences, so that  FC(x) preservesall information
about incentives contained in payoff vector FC(x).Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Survival of dominated strategies 355
(i) The potential function (ii) The projected payoff vector ﬁeld
Figure 4. A coordination game.
(i) The potential function (ii) The projected payoff vector ﬁeld




3) with radii 0 <r<R< 1 √
6,a ss h o w ni nFigure 6(i); the second inequality
ensures that both circles are contained in the simplex. Finally, twist the portion of the
vector ﬁeld lying outside of the inner circle in a clockwise direction, excluding larger
and larger circles as the twisting proceeds, so that the outer circle is reached when the
total twist is 180◦. The resulting vector ﬁeld is pictured in Figure 6(ii). It is described356 Hofbauer and Sandholm Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
(i) Projected payoff vector ﬁeld for the coordination game
(ii) Projected payoff vector ﬁeld for the hypnodisk game

































where θ(x) equals 0 when |x−x∗|≤r, equals π when |x−x∗|≥R, and varies linearly in
between. We call the game H the hypnodisk game.
Whatdoesthisconstructionaccomplish? Insidetheinnercircle, H isidenticaltothe
coordination game FC. Thus, solutions to dynamics satisfying (PC) that start at states
in the inner circle besides x∗ must leave the inner circle. At states outside the outerTheoretical Economics 6 (2011) Survival of dominated strategies 357
circle, the drawing of H is identical to the drawing of the anticoordination game F−C.12
Therefore, solutions to dynamics satisfying (PC) that begin outside the outer circle must
enter the outer circle. Finally, at each state x in the annulus bounded by the two circles,
H(x) is not a componentwise constant vector. Therefore, states in the annulus are not
Nash equilibria, and so are not rest points of dynamics that satisfy (PC). We assemble
these observations in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Suppose that V is an evolutionary dynamic that satisﬁes conditions (C) and
(PC), and let H be the hypnodisk game. Then every solution to V H other than the station-
ary solution at x∗ enters the annulus with radii r and R and never leaves.
In fact, since there are no rest points in the annulus, the Poincaré–Bendixson theo-
rem implies that every nonstationary solution to V H converges to a limit cycle.
4.2.3 Thetwin Now, let F bethefour-strategygameobtainedfrom H byaddingatwin:
Fi(x1 x2 x3 x4) = Hi(x1 x2 x3 + x4) for i ∈{ 1 2 3} and F4(x) = F3(x).T h es e to fN a s h
equilibria of F is the line segment
NE =
 











































































at all x ∈ I. Therefore, solutions to dynamics satisfying (PC) starting in I − NE ascend
the potential function f
˜ C(x) = 1
2((x1)2 +(x2)2 +(x3 +x4)2) until they leave the set I.A t
states outside the set O,w eh a v et h a tF(x)=−˜ Cx, so solutions starting in X −O ascend
f− ˜ C(x) =− f
˜ C(x) until they enter O. The next lemma summarizes these points.
Lemma 4. Suppose that V is an evolutionary dynamic that satisﬁes conditions (C) and
(PC), and let F be the “hypnodisk with a twin” game. Then every solution to V F other
than the stationary solutions at states in NE enter region D = O −I and never leave.
12At states x outside the outer circle, H(x)=− x + 2
31  = −x = F−C(x).B u t s i n c e  H(x) =− x + 1
31 =
 F−C(x) at these states, the pictures of H and F−C, and hence the incentives in the two games, are the
same.358 Hofbauer and Sandholm Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Figure 7. RegionsO, I,a n dD = O −I.
4.2.4 The feeble twin To prove Theorem 1, we argued in Lemma 2 that under any of
the dynamics addressed by the theorem, nonstationary solution trajectories equalize
the utilization levels of identical twin strategies. If we presently focus on dynamics that
not only satisfy conditions (C), (PC), (NS), and (IN), but also treat different strategies
symmetrically, wecanarguethatinthehypnodiskwith atwingame F, allnonstationary
solutions of V F converge notonlyto region D, butalsototheplane P ={ x ∈ X :x3 = x4}.
Continuing with the argument from Section 3 then allows us to conclude that in Fd,t h e
game obtained from F by turning strategy 4 into a feeble twin (that is, by reducing the
payoff to strategy 4 uniformly by d>0), the fraction x4 playing the feeble twin exceeds
1
6 inﬁnitely often.
Since we prefer a result that imposes as little structure as possible on permissible
evolutionary dynamics, Theorem 2 avoids the assumption that different strategies are
treatedsymmetrically. Sincethismeansthatagentsmaywellbebiasedagainstchoosing
the dominated strategy, we can no longer prove that the fraction playing it repeatedly
exceeds 1
6. But we can still prove that the dominated strategy survives. To accomplish
this,itisenoughtoshowthatingameF,mostsolutionsofthedynamicV F convergetoa
set on which x4 is bounded away from 0. If we can do this, then repeating the continuity
argument that concluded the proof of Theorem 1 shows that in game Fd, the dominated
strategy 4 survives.
AcompleteproofthatmostsolutionsofV F convergetoasetonwhichx4 isbounded
away from 0 is presented in Appendix C. We summarize the argument here. To begin, it
can be shown that all solutions to V F starting outside a small neighborhood of the seg-
ment of Nash equilibria NE converge to an attractor A, a compact set that is contained
in region D and that is an invariant set of the dynamic V F.
Nowsupposebywayofcontradictionthattheattractor A intersects Z ={ x ∈ X :x4 =
0},t h ef a c eo fX on which twin is unused. The Lipschitz continuity of the dynamic V F
implies that backward solutions starting in Z cannot enter X − Z. Since A is forward
and backward invariant under V F,t h ef a c tt h a tA intersects Z implies the existence of aTheoretical Economics 6 (2011) Survival of dominated strategies 359
Figure 8. The best response correspondence of the hypnodisk game.
closed orbit γ ⊂ A ∩Z that circumnavigates the disk I ∩Z. Examining the best response
correspondenceofthehypnodiskgame(Figure8),weﬁndthatsuchanorbitγ mustpass
through a region in which strategy 3 is a best response. But since the twin strategy 4 is
alsoabestresponseinthisregion,innovation(IN)tellsusthatsolutionspassingthrough
this region must reenter the interior of X, contradicting that the attractor A intersects
the face Z.
5. Discussion
5.1 Constructing games in which dominated strategies survive
If an evolutionary dynamic satisﬁes monotonicity condition (PC), all of its rest points
are Nash equilibria. It follows that dominated strategies can survive only on solution
trajectories that do not converge to rest points. To construct games in which dominated
strategies can survive, one ﬁrst looks for games in which convergence rarely occurs.
The hypnodisk game, the starting point for the proof of the main theorem, is a pop-
ulation game with nonlinear payoff functions. Such games are uncommon in the early
literature on evolution in games, which focuses on random matching settings. But pop-
ulation games with nonlinear payoffs are more common now, in part because of their
appearance in applications. For example, the standard model of driver behavior in a
highway network is a congestion game with nonlinear payoff functions, as delays on
each network link are increasing, convex functions of the number of drivers using the
link.13 For this reason, we do not view the use of a game with nonlinear payoffs as a
shortcoming of our analysis. But despite this, it seems worth asking whether our results
could be proved within the linear, random matching framework.
13Congestion games with a continuum of agents are studied by Beckmann et al. (1956) and Sandholm
(2001). For ﬁnite player congestion games, see Rosenthal (1973) and Monderer and Shapley (1996).360 Hofbauer and Sandholm Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
In Section 3, where we consider dynamics with prespeciﬁed functional forms, we
are able to prove survival results within the linear setting. More generally, if we ﬁx an
evolutionary dynamic before seeking a population game, ﬁnding a linear game that ex-
hibits cycling seems a feasible task. Still, a virtue of our analysis in Section 4 is that it
avoids this case-by-case analysis: the hypnodisk game generates cycling under all of the
relevantdynamicssimultaneously,enablingustoprovesurvivalofdominatedstrategies
under all of these dynamics at once.
Couldwedothesameusinglinearpayoffs? ConsiderthefollowinggameofHofbauer
and Swinkels (1996) (see also Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998, Section 8.6):
















When ε = 0,t h eg a m eF0 is a potential game with potential function f(x)=− (x1x3 +
x2x4). It has two components of Nash equilibria: one is a singleton containing the com-




4); the other is the closed curve γ containing
edges e1e2, e2e3, e3e4,a n de4e1. The former component is a saddle point of f,a n ds o
is unstable under dynamics that satisfy (PC); the latter component is the maximizer set
of f, and so attracts most solutions of these dynamics.
If ε is positive but sufﬁciently small, Theorem 3 implies that most solutions of dy-
namics satisfying (PC) lead to an attractor near γ.B u t o n c e ε is positive, the unique
Nash equilibrium of Fε is the mixed equilibrium x∗. Therefore, the attractor near γ is far
from any Nash equilibrium.
If we now introduce a feeble twin, we expect that this dominated strategy would
survive in the resulting ﬁve-strategy game. But in this case, evolutionary dynamics run
on a four-dimensional state space. Proving survival results when the dimension of the
statespaceexceedsthreeisverydifﬁcult,evenifweﬁxthedynamicunderconsideration
inadvance. Thispointstoanotheradvantageofthehypnodiskgame: itallowsustowork
with dynamics on a three-dimensional state space, where the analysis is still tractable.
5.2 How dominated can surviving strategies be?
Since the dynamics we consider are nonlinear, our proofs of survival of dominated
strategies are topological in nature, and so do not quantify the level of domination that
is consistent with a dominated strategy maintaining a signiﬁcant presence in the popu-
lation. We can provide a sense of this magnitude by way of numerical analysis.
OuranalysisconsidersthebehavioroftheBNNandSmithdynamicsinthefollowing
version of bad RPS with a feeble twin:
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Figure 9(i) presents the maximum, time-average, and minimum weight on the domi-
nated strategy in the limit cycle of the BNN dynamic, where these weights are presented
as functions of the domination level d. The ﬁgure shows that until the dominated strat-
egy twin is eliminated, its presence declines at a roughly linear rate in d.T w i ni sp l a y e d
recurrently by at least 10% of the population when d ≤ 0 14, by at least 5% of the popu-
lation when d ≤ 0 19, and by at least 1% of the population when d ≤ 0 22.
Figure 9(ii) shows that under the Smith dynamic, the decay in the use of the domi-
nated strategy is much more gradual. In this case, twin is recurrently played by at least
10%ofthepopulationwhend ≤ 0 31,byatleast5%ofthepopulationwhend ≤ 0 47,and
by at least 1% of the population when d ≤ 0 66. These values of d are surprisingly large
relative to the base payoff values of 0, −2,a n d1; even strategies that are dominated by a
signiﬁcant margin can be played in perpetuity under common evolutionary dynamics.
The reason for the difference between the two dynamics is easy to explain. As we
saw in Section 3, the BNN dynamic describes the behavior of agents who compare a
candidate strategy’s payoff with the average payoff in the population. For its part, the
Smith dynamic is based on comparisons between the candidate strategy’s payoff and an
agent’s current payoff. The latter speciﬁcation makes it relatively easy for agents who
obtain a low payoff from paper or rock to switch to the dominated strategy twin.
5.3 Exact and hybrid imitative dynamics
An important class of dynamics that is excluded by our results is imitative dynamics,
a class that includes the replicator dynamic as its best-known example. In general, imi-
tative dynamics are derived from revision protocols of the form
ρij(π x) = xjrij(π x) 
The xj term reﬂects the fact that when an agent receives a revision opportunity, he se-
lects an opponent at random and then decides whether to imitate this opponent’s strat-
egy. Substituting ρ into (1), we see that imitative dynamics take the simple form








≡ xipi(F(x) x) 
In other words, each strategy’s absolute growth rate ˙ xi is proportional to its level of uti-
lization xi.















Now suppose that percentage growth rates are monotone, in the sense that
pi(π x) ≥ pj(π x) if and only if πi ≥ πj 362 Hofbauer and Sandholm Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
(i) BNN
(ii) Smith
Figure 9. The maximum, time-average, and minimum weight on the dominated strategy in
the limit cycles of the BNN and Smith dynamics. These weights are presented as functions of the
domination level d in game (7).Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Survival of dominated strategies 363
(i) standard RPS with a twin (ii) standard RPS with a feeble twin
Figure 10. The replicator dynamic in two games.
Then if strategy i strictly dominates strategy j,t h er i g h th a n ds i d eo f( 9)i sp o s i t i v ea ta l l
x ∈ int(X). We can therefore conclude that the dominated strategy j vanishes along ev-
ery interior solution trajectory of (8). This is Samuelson and Zhang’s (1992) elimination
result.14
Equation (9) can be used to explain why elimination results for imitative dynamics
are fragile. Suppose now that strategies i and j always earn the same payoffs. In this
case, the right hand side of (9) is identically zero on int(X), implying that the ratio xi/xj
is constant along every interior solution trajectory. For instance, in Figure 10(i), a phase
diagram of the replicator dynamic in standard RPS with a twin, we see that the planes
on which the ratio xS/xT is constant are invariant sets. If we make the twin feeble by
lowering its payoff uniformly by d, we obtain the dynamics pictured in Figure 10(ii):
now the ratio xS/xT increases monotonically, and the dominated strategy is eliminated.
Theexistenceofacontinuumofinvarianthyperplanesingameswithidenticaltwins
is crucial to this argument. At the same time, dynamics with a continuum of invariant
hyperplanes are structurally unstable. If we ﬁx the game but slightly alter the agents’
revision protocol, these invariant sets can collapse, overturning the elimination result.
As an example, suppose that instead of always following an imitative protocol,
agents occasionally use a protocol that allows switches to unused strategies. This sit-
uation is illustrated in Figure 11(i), which contains thephasediagram forabad RPSwith
atwin gameunderaconvex combinationofthereplicatorand Smithdynamics.15 While
14Sandholm et al. (2008) establish close links between the replicator dynamic and the projection dy-
namic of Nagurney and Zhang (1997). They show that on the interior of the simplex, these two dynamics
share a property called inﬂow–outﬂow symmetry, which ensures that dominated strategies lose ground to
the strategies that dominate them. But the projection dynamic is discontinuous at the boundary of the
simplex, and its behavior on the boundary can allow dominated strategies to survive.
15In particular, we consider the bad RPS game with payoffs 0, −11
10, and 1, and the combined dy-
namic that puts weight 9
10 on the replicator dynamic and weight 1
10 on the Smith dynamic. This dy-
namic is generated by the corresponding convex combination of the underlying revision protocols: ρij =
9
10xj[Fj −Fi]+ + 1
10[Fj −Fi]+.364 Hofbauer and Sandholm Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
(i) bad RPS with a twin (ii) bad RPS with a feeble twin
Figure 11. The 9
10 replicator + 1
10 Smith dynamic in two games.
Figure 11(i) displays a continuum of invariant hyperplanes, Figure 11(i) shows almost
all solution trajectories converging to a limit cycle on the plane where xS = xT.I f w e
then make the twin feeble, the limit cycle moves slightly to the left, and the dominated
strategy survives (Figure 11(ii)).
5.4 Exact and perturbed best response dynamics
Of the basic evolutionary dynamics presented in Table 1, it remains to consider the best
response dynamic of Gilboa and Matsui (1991). The best response dynamic is deﬁned by
˙ x ∈ BF(x)−x  where BF(x) = argmax
y∈X
y F(x)
is the set of mixed best responses to population state x. This dynamic describes the be-
havior of agents who occasionally receive opportunities to switch strategies, and switch
to a best response whenever such an opportunity arises. It is obvious that the best re-
sponse dynamic eliminates any strictly dominated strategy: since such strategies are
never best responses, the weight on them vanishes at an exponential rate.
Thebestresponsedynamicisdeﬁnedbyadiscontinuousdifferentialinclusion. Ifwe
approximate the best response dynamic by a continuous differential equation—for in-
stance, by a dynamic deﬁned in terms of perturbed best responses—the resulting limit
behavior can change dramatically, allowing dominated strategies to endure in signiﬁ-
cant proportions.16
16As an aside, we note that the limit behavior of the best response dynamic itself can change discontin-
uously as we change the payoffs of the underlying game. For instance, in game (7), a positive dominance
level d leads the best response dynamic to have a triangular limit cycle on the face of the simplex where
the dominated strategy twin is unused (cf. Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer 1995), while a negative value of d
transfers this limit cycle to the face where the now-dominated strategy scissors is unused. But when d is
zero, so that scissors and twin are identical, the union of the three planes that connect the corresponding
sides of the triangles is an attractor, and any point on this surface can be reached from any other. For more
on attractors of differential inclusions, see Benaïm et al. (2005).Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Survival of dominated strategies 365
Figure 12. The maximum weight on the dominated strategy in limit cycles of the logit(η) dy-
namic, η = 0 01 0 05 0 10,a n d0 20,i ng a m e( 7). Weights are presented as functions of the dom-
ination level d.
To illustrate this, we consider the logit dynamic of Fudenberg and Levine (1998):






The logit dynamic describes the aggregate behavior of agents who update strategies by
applyingthelogitrule LF. Whenthenoiselevel η>0 issmall,thelogitruleplacesnearly
all probability on optimal strategies, but this rule always places positive probability on
all available strategies. It follows immediately that the boundary of the simplex is re-
pelling under the logit dynamic, implying that there is a trivial sense in which all strate-
gies must survive in positive proportions. But when the noise level η is small, the min-
imal level of use of each strategy ensured directly by repulsion from the boundary is
miniscule.17 It is therefore still meaningful to ask whether strictly dominated strategies
can survive under the logit dynamic in economically signiﬁcant proportions.
Figure 12 presents the results of a numerical analysis of the logit dynamic in the bad
RPS with a feeble twin game from (7). The four curves represent the maximum weight
on thedominatedstrategy twin in thestablelimitcycleof the logit(η) dynamic fornoise
17See, for instance, Example 6.2.2 of Sandholm (2010b).366 Hofbauer and Sandholm Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
levels η = 0 01, 0 05, 0 10,a n d0 20.18 In each case, the weight on twin is presented as a
function of the domination level d in game (7).
Whenboththenoiselevelηandthedominationleveld areverycloseto0,theweight
on the dominated strategy twin recurrently approaches values of nearly 2
7.19 For small
ﬁxed values of η, the maximum weight on the dominated strategy falls rapidly as the
domination d level increases.
Higher values of η introduce more randomness into agents’ choices, creating a force
that pushes the population state toward the center of the simplex. This inward force
reduces the maximal weight on the dominated strategy at low values of d, but allows
the dominated strategy to maintain a signiﬁcant presence at considerably higher values
of d.
5.5 On the necessity of the sufﬁcient conditions for survival
Our main result shows that dynamics satisfying conditions (C), (PC), (NS), and (IN) fail
to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. While we believe that these
conditions are uncontroversial, it is still natural to ask whether they are obligatory to
reach the conclusions we establish here.
Our continuity condition (C) seems unavoidable. This condition excludes best re-
sponse dynamics, which satisfy the three remaining conditions and eliminate strictly
dominated strategies in all games. Still, continuity is a natural restriction to impose on
dynamics that aim to describe the behavior of myopic, imperfectly informed agents.
The results in this paper can be viewed as a demonstration of one counterintuitive con-
sequence of this realistic requirement.
Our analysis in Section 4 uses innovation (IN) to establish that in the hypnodisk
game with an exact twin, the mass placed on the twin strategy at states in the attrac-
tor A is bounded away from zero. It seems to us that in the presence of the other three
conditions, a fourth condition signiﬁcantly weaker than or of a different nature than
condition (IN) might sufﬁce to establish survival results.
Positivecorrelation(PC)andNashstationarity(NS)linkthedirectionsofmotionun-
der an evolutionary dynamic and the identity of its stationary states to the payoffs in the
game at hand. As such, they help us specify what we mean by an evolutionary dynamic.
It is nevertheless worth asking whether conditions (NS) and (PC) are necessary to prove
survival results. Suppose ﬁrst that one follows the “uniform” approach from Section 4,
seeking a single game that generates nonconvergence and survival in the class of dy-
namics under consideration. Clearly, achieving this aim requires one to constrain the
class of dynamics by means of some general restrictions on the allowable directions of
18To interpret the analysis, note that a noise level of η corresponds to the introduction of indepen-
dent and identically distributed extreme-value distributed payoff disturbances with standard deviation
πη/
√
6 ≈ 1 28η;s e eAnderson et al. (1992) or Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002).
19Toseewhy,notethatunderthebestresponsedynamicforbadRPS,themaximumweightonscissorsin
the limit cycle is 4
7 (see Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer 1995). If we move from the best response dynamic to
a low-noise logit dynamic and introduce a slightly dominated strategy twin, a total weight of approximately
4
7 is split nearly evenly between scissors and twin.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Survival of dominated strategies 367
motion from each population state. We employ condition (PC) because it is the weakest
condition that connects payoffs to the direction of motion that appears in the literature,
and we employ condition (NS) because it restricts the set of stationary states in an eco-
nomically sensible way. One could use other conditions instead to ensure the existence
of a badly behaved game; by combining these conditions with (C) and (IN), one could
again obtain survival results.
Alternatively, one could consider a “non-uniform” approach, constructing a possi-
bly distinct game that generates nonconvergence and survival for each dynamic under
consideration. Given the attendant freedom to tailor the game to the dynamic at hand,
it seems possible that continuity (C) and Nash stationarity (NS) on their own might be
enough to establish a survival result. Proving such a result would require one to deﬁne a
method of assigning each evolutionary dynamic (i.e., each map from games to differen-
tialequations)abadlybehavedgamewithapairoftwinstrategies,andthentoshowthat
in each case, the resulting differential equation admits an interior attractor with a large
basin of attraction. Whether this approach can be brought to fruition is a challenging
question for future research.
6. Conclusion
Traditional game-theoretic analyses rule out strictly dominated strategies, as playing
such strategies is inconsistent with decision-theoretic rationality. This paper argues
that in settings where evolutionary game models are appropriate, the justiﬁcation for
eliminating dominated strategies is far less secure. When evolutionary dynamics con-
verge, their limits are equilibria of the underlying game, and so exclude strictly domi-
nated strategies. But guarantees of convergence are available only for a few classes of
games. When dynamics fail to converge, the payoffs of the available strategies remain
in ﬂux. If agents are not exact optimizers, but instead choose among strategies whose
current payoffs are reasonably high, dominated strategies may be played by signiﬁcant
numbers of agents in perpetuity.
Appendix A: Co n t i n u a t i o no fa t t r a c t o r s
Let X be a compact metric space and let φ be a semiﬂow on X;t h u s ,φ:[0 ∞) × X →
X is a continuous map satisfying φ0(x) = x and φt(φs(x)) = φt+s(x) for all s t ≥ 0
and x ∈ X.A s e t A ⊂ X is an attractor of φ if there is a neighborhood U of A such
that ω(U) = A (see Conley 1978). Here the ω-limit set of U is deﬁned as ω(U) =  
t>0cl(φ[t ∞)(U)), where for T ⊂ R,w el e tφT(U) =
 
t∈T φt(U). An attractor is com-
pact and invariant (φt(A) = A for all t). Observe that an attractor can strictly contain
another attractor.
The basin of the attractor is deﬁned as B(A) ={ x:ω(x)⊆ A}. For each open set U
withA ⊂ U ⊂ cl(U) ⊂ B(A),w ehav eω(cl(U)) = A;seeSectionII.5.1.AofConley(1978).
Furthermore, if φt(cl(U)) ⊂ U holds for some t>0 and for some open set U (which is
then called a trapping region), then ω(U) is an attractor; see Section II.5.1.C of Conley
(1978).368 Hofbauer and Sandholm Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
For a ﬂow {φt}t∈R, the complement of the basin B(A) of the attractor A is called
the dual repellor of A.F o r a l l x ∈ B(A) − A, φt(x) approaches this dual repellor as t
approaches minus inﬁnity.
Consider now a one-parameter family of differential equations ˙ x = Vε(x) in Rn
(with unique solutions x(t) =  t
ε(x(0)))s u c ht h a t(ε x)  → Vε(x) is continuous. Then
(ε t x) →  t
ε(x) is continuous as well. Suppose that X ⊂ Rn is compact and forward
invariant under the semiﬂows  ε.F o rε = 0, we omit the subscript in  t.
Thefollowingcontinuationtheoremforattractorsispartofthefolkloreofdynamical
systems; compare, e.g., Proposition 8.1 of Smale (1967).
Theorem 3. Let A be an attractor for   with basin B(A). Then for each small enough
ε>0, there exists an attractor Aε of  ε with basin B(Aε), such that the map ε  → Aε is
upper hemicontinuous and the map ε  → B(Aε) is lower hemicontinuous.
Upper hemicontinuity cannot be replaced by continuity in this result. Consider the
family of differential equations ˙ x = (ε + x2)(1 − x) on the real line. The semiﬂow  
corresponding to ε = 0 admits A =[ 0 1] as an attractor, but when ε>0, the unique
attractor of  ε is Aε ={ 1}. This example shows that perturbations can cause attractors
to implode; the theorem shows that perturbations cannot cause attractors to explode.
Theorem 3 is a direct consequence of the following lemma, which is sufﬁcient to
prove the results in Sections 3 and 4.
Lemma 5. Let A be an attractor for   with basin B(A),a n dl e tU1 and U2 be open sets
satisfying A ⊂ U1 ⊆ U2 ⊆ cl(U2) ⊆ B(A). Then for each small enough ε>0, there exists
an attractor Aε of  ε with basin B(Aε),s u c ht h a tAε ⊂ U1 and U2 ⊂ B(Aε).
In this lemma, one can always set U1 ={ x:dist(x A) < δ} and U2 ={ x ∈ B(A):
dist(x X −B(A)) > δ} for some small enough δ>0.
ProofofLemma5. SinceAisanattractorandω(cl(U2)) = A,ther eisaT>0suchthat
 t(cl(U2)) ⊂ U1 for t ≥ T. By the continuous dependence of the ﬂow on the parameter ε
and the compactness of  T(cl(U2)),w eh a v et h a t T
ε (cl(U2)) ⊂ U1 ⊆ U2 for all small
enough ε.T h u s , U2 is a trapping region for the semiﬂow  ε,a n dAε ≡ ω(U2) is an
attractor for  ε.M o r e o v e r ,Aε ⊂ U1 (since Aε =  T
ε (Aε) ⊆  T
ε (cl(U2)) ⊂ U1)a n dU2 ⊂
B(Aε). 
Appendix B: Proofs omitted from Section 3
B.1 The proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 states that the set of Nash equilibria NE ={ x∗ ∈ X :x∗ = (1
3  1
3 α 1
3 −α)} in the
badRPSTgameF(x)= ˜ AxisarepellorunderthedynamicsdeﬁnedinTheorem1.T h e s e
dynamics are generated by revision protocols of the forms
ρij = φ(Fj − ¯ F) (10)Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Survival of dominated strategies 369
and
ρij = φ(Fj −Fi)  (11)
where φ:R → R+ is a Lipschitz continuous function satisfying





   
u=0
> 0  (12)
Equation (12) implies that for any ¯ d>0, there are positive constants k1 and k2 such
that
k1d ≤ φ(d)≤ k2d for all d ∈[ 0  ¯ d]  (13)
Choosing ¯ d = 2maxi x |Fi(x)| ensures that bound (13) holds for all values of d relevant to









d2 for all d ∈[ 0  ¯ d]  (15)
We now split the analysis into two parts, according to whether the dynamic is based
on a protocol of form (10)o r( 11).
Lemma 6. Let F(x)= ˜ Ax be the bad RPS with a twin game from (5), and let V be the
excess payoff dynamic generated by protocol (10), with φ satisfying condition (12). Then
the set NE is a repellor under V F.
Proof.D e ﬁ n e t h e excess payoff to strategy i by ˆ Fi(x) = Fi(x)− ¯ F(x). Then using (1), we
can express the dynamic V F as
˙ xi = φ( ˆ Fi(x))−xi
 
j∈S
φ( ˆ Fj(x))  (16)




φ( ˆ Fj(x)) 
then  (x) ≥ 0, with equality if and only if x is a Nash equilibrium of F (see Sandholm
2005).




ψ( ˆ Fi(x)) 
where ψ is deﬁned in (14). Hofbauer (2000) and Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009) show
that U(x)≥ 0, with equality holding if and only if x is a Nash equilibrium of F.T h e370 Hofbauer and Sandholm Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
proof of this theorem shows that the time derivative of U under the dynamic (16)c a nb e
expressed as
˙ U(x)= ˙ x  ˜ A˙ x− (x)F(x)  ˙ x  (17)
T op r o v eo u rl e m m a ,w en e e dt os h o wt h a t ˙ U(x)>0 whenever x/ ∈ NE and dist(x NE) is
sufﬁciently small.
Let TX={ z ∈ R4:z 1 = 0}, the tangent space of the simplex X,s ot h a t˙ x ∈ TX,a n d
suppose that z ∈ TX. Then letting (ζ1 ζ2 ζ3) = (z1 z2 z3 +z4),w eh a v et h a t
z  ˜ Az = (a−b)(z1z2 +z2(z3 +z4)+(z3 +z4)z1)
























((z1)2 +(z2)2 +(z3 +z4)2) 
Now if x/ ∈ NE, we can write (16)a s
˙ x =  (x)(σ(x)−x)  (19)
where σ(x)∈ X is given by σi(x) = φ( ˆ Fi(x))/ (x). Since x/ ∈ NE, some strategy i has
a below average payoff (Fi(x) < ¯ F(x)), implying that σi(x) = 0 and hence that σ(x)∈
bd(X). In fact, since strategies 3 and 4 always earn the same payoff, we have that
σ3(x) = 0 if and only if σ4(x) = 0.
If we now write y = (x1 x2 x3 + x4) and τ(x) = (σ1(x) σ2(x) σ3(x) + σ4(x)),
then (19) becomes
˙ y =  (x)(τ(x)−y) 
The arguments in the previous paragraph show that τ(x) is on the boundary of the




3)| <ε , giving us a uniform bound on the distance between τ(x) and y,a n d
hence a uniform lower bound on |˙ y|:
|˙ y|≥c (x)
for some c>0. By squaring and rewriting in terms of ˙ x,w eo b t a i n
˙ x2
1 + ˙ x2
2 +(˙ x3 + ˙ x4)2 ≥ c2 (x)2  (20)
Thus, combining (18)a n d( 20) shows that if dist(x NE)<ε,t h e n
˙ x  ˜ A˙ x ≥ 1
2(b−a)c2 (x)2  (21)Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Survival of dominated strategies 371
To bound the second term of (17), use (13) to show that
 (x)F(x)  ˙ x =  (x)( ˆ F(x)− ¯ F(x)1)  ˙ x













































Since  (x) ≥ 0, with equality only when x ∈ NE, we conclude that ˙ U(x)>0 whenever
x/ ∈ NE is close enough to NE, and therefore that NE is a repellor under (16). 
Lemma7. LetF(x)= ˜ Ax bethebadRPSwithatwingamefrom(5),andletV bethepair-
wise comparison dynamic generated by protocol (11), with φ satisfying condition (12).
Then the set NE is a repellor under V F.








Sandholm (2010a) shows that the rest points of (23) are the Nash equilibria of F.







where ψ is deﬁned in (14). Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009) (also see Smith 1984)s h o w
that  (x) ≥ 0, with equality holding if and only if x is a Nash equilibrium of F.T h e372 Hofbauer and Sandholm Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
proof of that theorem shows that the time derivative of   under the dynamic (23)c a nb e
expressed as















Equation (18) tells us that T1(x) ≥ 0, with equality when x ∈ NE (i.e., when ˙ x = 0).
Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009) show that T2(x) ≤ 0, with equality only when x ∈ NE. To
prove the lemma, we must show that T1(x)+T2(x) > 0 whenever x/ ∈ NE and dist(x NE)
is sufﬁciently small.
To begin, observe that since F is linear, we have that
[Fj(x)−Fi(x)]+ ≤ c1dist(x NE) (25)
for some c1 > 0. Equations (13), (15), and (25) immediately yield a cubic bound on T2:
|T2(x)|≤c2dist(x NE)3 (26)
for some c2 > 0.





Fj(x) ≥ c3dist(x NE) (27)




xjφ(F1(x)−Fj(x)) ≥ (x3 +x4)φ(F1(x)−F3(x)) ≥ (x3 +x4)c3k1dist(x NE) 




φ(Fj(x)−F1(x)) ≥ x1φ(F3(x)−F1(x)) ≥ x1c3k1dist(x NE) 
Obtaining bounds on |˙ x1| and on |˙ x2| for the remaining four cases in like fashion, we
ﬁnd that for some c4 > 0 and some ε>0,f o ra n yx with dist(x NE) ≤ ε (and hence
|x1 − 1
3|≤ε, |x2 − 1
3|≤ε,a n d|(x3 +x4)− 1
3|≤ε), we have that
˙ x2
1 + ˙ x2
2 +(˙ x3 + ˙ x4)2 ≥ max(˙ x2
1  ˙ x2
2) ≥ c4dist(x NE)2  (28)
Thus, (18)a n d( 28) together imply that for such x,
T1(x) = ˙ x  ˜ A˙ x ≥ 1
2(b−a)c4dist(x NE)2  (29)
Combining (24), (26), and (29), we ﬁnd that
˙  (x) ≥ 1
2(b−a)c4dist(x NE)2 −c2dist(x NE)3Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Survival of dominated strategies 373
whenever dist(x NE) ≤ ε. We therefore conclude that ˙  (x) > 0 whenever x is sufﬁ-
ciently close to but not in NE, and so that NE is a repellor under (23). 
B.2 The proof of Lemma 2
Let {xt}t≥0 be the solution to V F from initial condition ξ ∈ X −NE, and suppose without
loss of generality that ξ3 ≥ ξ4.T h e n( 6)i m p l i e st h a t(x3 − x4)t is positive and is nonin-
creasing in t, while Lemma 1 reveals that there is a neighborhood U of NE and a time
T ≥ 0 such that {xt}∈X −U for all t ≥ T.
We split the remaining analysis into two cases. Suppose ﬁrst that the revision proto-
col ρ is of form (10), so that V is an excess payoff dynamic. In this case, (6) becomes
˙ x3 − ˙ x4 =− (x3 −x4)
 
j∈S
φ(Fj(x)− ¯ F(x))≡− (x3 −x4) (x) 
Sandholm(2005)showsthat  (x)≥ 0,withequalityifandonlyif x isaNashequilibrium
of F. Since U is an open neighborhood of NE, it follows that m = minx∈X−U  (x)>0.
Thus (d/dt)(x3 − x4)t ≤− m(x3 − x4)t for all t ≥ T, from which we conclude that
limt→∞(x3 −x4)t = 0.
Now suppose that ρ is of form (11), so that V is a pairwise comparison dynamic. In
this case, (6) becomes




Since (x3 − x4)t is positive and is nonincreasing in t, it converges to some nonneg-
ative limit l.T h u s , ω(ξ),t h eω-limit set of trajectory {xt}, is contained in the plane
Pl ={ x ∈ X :x3 − x4 = l}.A l s o , ω(ξ) is compact and invariant by deﬁnition (see, e.g.,
Robinson 1995), and ω(ξ)is disjoint from NE by Lemma 1.
Now assume that l is positive. Then (30), combined with the fact that ω(ξ) is in-
variant and a subset of Pl,i m p l i e st h a t
 
j∈S φ(Fj(x) − F3(x)) = 0 for all x ∈ ω(ξ).I t
then follows from condition (12) (namely, from the fact that sgn(φ(u)) = sgn([u]+))t h a t
strategy 3 is optimal throughout ω(ξ); the identical twin strategy 4 must be so as well.
But it is easy to check that under any pairwise comparison dynamic V F for the bad RPS
with a twin game F, optimal strategies have positive growth rates at any non-Nash state.
Since ω(ξ)is disjoint from NE, we conclude that V F
3 (x)+V F
4 (x) > 0 whenever x ∈ ω(ξ).
At the same time, since ω(ξ) is compact, χ = argmaxx∈ω(ξ)x3 + x4 exists, and since
ω(ξ) is also invariant, it must be that V F
3 (χ) + V F
4 (χ) ≤ 0. This is a contradiction. We
therefore conclude that l = 0,a n ds ot h a t{xt} converges to the plane P0 = P. 
Appendix C: Proofs details omitted from Section 4.2.4
Our analysis relieson thenotion ofattractor–repellorpairs introducedby Conley (1978);
see Robinson (1995) for a textbook treatment. Deﬁne the ﬂow from the set U ⊆ X under
the dynamic V F by
φt(U) ={ ξ ∈ X :there is a solution {xs} to ˙ x = V F(x) with x0 ∈ U and xt = ξ} 374 Hofbauer and Sandholm Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
In words, φt(U) containsthetime t positionsofsolutionsto V F whoseinitial conditions
are in U.
Recall that solutions to V F starting in I − NE ascend the function f
˜ C until leaving
the set I. It follows that the set NE is a repellor under V F: all backward-time solutions to




φt(cl(U)) = NE 
Thedualattractor A oftherepellorNEistheforward-timelimitoftheﬂowofV F starting





Lemma 4 tells us that A ⊂ D. Three other key properties of the attractor A are noted
next.
Lemma 8. The attractor A is nonempty, compact, and forward and backward invariant
under V F.
These properties of attractors are well known; for proofs, see Conley (1978) or
Robinson (1995).
We now show that A is contained in the interior of the simplex. To do so, we let
Z ={ x ∈ X :x4 = 0} be the face of X on which the twin strategy is unused. We prove the
following lemma.
Lemma 9. The attractor A and the face Z are disjoint.
Proof.R e c a l lt h a tV F(x) = g(F(x) x),w h e r et h eg r o w t hr a t ef u n c t i o ng is Lipschitz
continuous (by condition (C)) and satisﬁes gi(π x) ≥ 0 whenever xi = 0. It follows that
solutions to V F that start in X −Z cannot approach Z more than exponentially quickly,
and in particular cannot reach Z in ﬁnite time. Equivalently, backward solutions to V F
starting from states in Z cannot enter int(X).
Now suppose by way of contradiction that there exists a state ξ in A ∩ Z.T h e nb y
Lemma 8 and the previous paragraph, the entire backward orbit from ξ is also con-
tained in A ∩ Z, and hence in D ∩ Z. Since the latter set contains no rest points (by
condition (PC)), the Poincaré–Bendixson theorem implies that the backward orbit from
ξ converges to a closed orbit γ in D∩Z that circumnavigates I ∩Z.
By construction, the annulus D ∩ Z can be split into three regions: one in which
strategy 1 is the best response, one in which strategy 2 is the best response, and one
in which strategy 3 (and hence strategy 4) is a best response. Each of these regions is
bounded by a simple closed curve that intersects the inner and outer boundaries of the
annulus. Therefore, the closed orbit γ, on which strategy 4 is unused, passes through
the region in which strategy 4 is optimal. This contradicts innovation (IN). Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Survival of dominated strategies 375
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